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ci.2012.0Abstract Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm of computing that replaces computing as a per-
sonal commodity by computing as a public utility. As such, it offers all the advantages of a public
utility system, in terms of economy of scale, ﬂexibility, convenience but it raises major issues, not least
of which are: loss of control and loss of security. In this paper, we explore a user-centered measure of
cyber-security, and see how this measure can be used to analyze cloud computing as a business model.
ª 2012 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Cloud computing: challenges and opportunities
In the early days of computing, computer resources were a cen-
tralized organizational asset, that represents a massive invest-
ment of money, time and labor; only large organizations
could afford to acquire, maintain and operate such infrastruc-
tures. With the advent of personal computers in the 1980s, the
prevailing computing paradigm changed drastically: ﬁrst, the
low cost of personal computers opened a worldwide market
of people and organizations large and small; second, this situ-
ation fostered, in turn, a large pool of talent that was able to
develop and distribute PC-based applications, at the same time
as it was creating a market for such applications; third, the
centralized paradigm of mainframe-based computing at large
organizations was progressively replaced by local area net-
works, linking servers and terminal computers within an orga-
nization; fourth, the pervasiveness of the Internet transformed(L.B.A. Rabai).
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6.002the global mass of personal computers into a massive network
of nodes, sharing information, services, software, and malware
of all kinds.
Even though personal computers are fairly dependable in
general, and require relatively little expertise to maintain and
operate, under this computing paradigm end-users are still
responsible for operating a complex machine about which they
understand very little. Also, each individual computer is used a
minimal fraction of the time, and typically deploys only a very
small fraction of its wide range of software and hardware capa-
bilities. Furthermore, the safekeeping of a user’s data is the
responsibility of the user alone, who must rely on precarious
media such as hard disks, compact disks, and ﬂash memory,
which are prone to loss, damage, and theft.
Against this background, it is easy to see the attractiveness
of a computing paradigm where end users avail themselves of
computing resources and services as a public utility, rather
than a privately run small scale computing facility. In the same
way that we use electricity as a public utility (rather than build
our own generators), and that we use water as a public utility
(rather than dig our own well), and that we use phone service
as a public utility (rather than build and operate our own cell
tower), we may want to use computing services as a public
utility. Such a service would be available to individuals andier B.V. All rights reserved.
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pattern as other public utilities, namely:
 Subscribers sign up for service from a service provider, on a
contractual basis.
 The service provider delivers services of data processing,
data access and data storage to subscribers.
 The service provider offers warranties on the quality of ser-
vices delivered.
 Subscribers are charged according to the services they use.
This modus operandi offers the usual advantages of public
utilities, in terms of efﬁciency (higher usage rates of servers),
economies of scale (time sharing of computing resources),
capacity (virtually unlimited computing power, bounded only
by provider assets rather than by individual user assets), con-
venience (no need for users to be computer-savvy, no need
for tech support), dependability (provided by highly trained
provider staff), service quality (virtually unlimited data storage
capacity, protected against damage and loss), etc. This new
paradigm is what we refer to as cloud computing (Armbrust
et al., 2009; Mell and Grance, 2009, 2010; Vaquero et al.,
2009; Wang et al., 2008; Rittinghouse and Ransome, 2010).
The migration from a personal computer based paradigm to
a cloud computing paradigm carries some risks along with its
many rewards, not least of which are the loss of control and
the loss of security (Hanna, 2009; Ibrahim et al., 2010; Suba-
shini and Kavitha, 2010; Rittinghouse and Ransome, 2010;
Wooley, 2011; Xuan et al., 2010). Indeed, by trusting its critical
data to a service provider, a user (whether it be an individual or
an organization) takes risks with the availability, conﬁdential-
ity and integrity of this data: availability may be affected if
the subscriber’s data is unavailable when needed, due for exam-
ple to a denial of service attack or merely to a loss; conﬁdenti-
ality may be affected if a subscriber’s data is inadvertently or
maliciously accessed by an unauthorized user, or otherwise un-
duly exposed; integrity may be affected if a subscriber’s data is
inadvertently or maliciously damaged or destroyed. In this pa-
per, we propose a security metric that enables service providers
and service subscribers to quantify the risks that they incur as a
result of prevailing security threats and system vulnerabilities.
The reason why security is a much bigger concern in cloud com-
puting than it is in other shared utility paradigms is that cloud
computing involves a two-way relationship between the pro-
vider and the subscriber: whereas the water grid and the electric
grid involve a one-way transfer from the provider to the sub-
scriber, cloud computing involves two-way communication,
including transferring information from subscribers to provid-
ers, which raises security concerns. Note that a telephone ser-
vice also involves the transfer of (vocal) information from
subscribers to providers, and it too raises security concerns
(possibility of wiretapping), though on a smaller scale.
The security metric we propose in this paper is quantiﬁed in
economic terms, thereby enabling providers and subscribers to
weight these risks against rewards, and to assess the cost effec-
tiveness of security countermeasures.2. Related work
In Speaks (2010), discusses the concept of reliability and its
measurement using MTTF and MTBF. Our work presents adependability metric, which encompasses security, and which
differs from MTTF and MTBF in that it reﬂects variance in
stakes and stakeholders, variance in security requirements
and their impact on stakeholders, variance in system compo-
nents and their impact on requirements, variance in security
threats and their impact on components, and variance in the
likelihood that threats materialize.
In Josson and Pirzadeh (2011) offer a taxonomy of security
metrics, which they divide between protective metrics (that re-
ﬂect the extent to which the system protects itself from perpe-
trator threats) and behavioral metrics (that reﬂect operational
attributes of the system). They propose three security metrics,
namely the traditional MTTF (Mean Time to Failure), as well
as MTTCF (Mean Time to Catastrophic Failure) and the
MTTR (Mean Time to Repair). The distinction that Jonsson
and Pirzadeh make between MTTF and MTTCF can be seen
as a special case of our stakes matrix: we do not classify fail-
ures into catastrophic and low impact failures; rather we let
users attach stakes to security requirements, ranging over a
continuum of values, hence including low stakes and high
stakes (when failure is considered catastrophic).
In (Barry, 2003; Barry and LiGuo, 2003; Barry, 2006),
Boehm et al. argue that all dilemmas that arise in software
engineering are of an economic nature rather than a technical
nature, and that all decisions ought to be modeled in economic
terms: maximizing beneﬁt; minimizing cost and risk. Our work
is perfectly compatible with the philosophy of value-based
software engineering, as it models system security not by an
arbitrary abstract scale but rather by an economic function
(MFC), quantiﬁed in monetary terms (dollars per hour), in
such a way as to enable rational decision making.
In Brunette and Mogull (2009) discuss the promise and per-
ils of cloud computing, and single out security as one of the
main concerns of this new computing paradigm. Also, they
catalog and classify the types of security threats that arise in
cloud computing or are ampliﬁed by the cloud paradigm. Their
work can be used to complement and consolidate our ap-
proach, in that it provides a comprehensive catalog of security
threats that are classiﬁed according to their type.
In Chow et al. (2009) explore the security concerns raised
by cloud computing in terms of three categories: provider-re-
lated vulnerabilities, which represent traditional security con-
cerns; availability, which arises in any shared system, and
most especially in cloud computing; and third party data con-
trol, which arises in cloud computing because user data is man-
aged by the cloud provider and may potentially be exposed to
malicious third parties. Chow et al. discuss strategies that may
be used to mitigate these security concerns. Similar concerns
are expressed by Carlin and Curran (2011).
In Black et al. (2009) discuss cyber security metrics, which
they characterize as reﬂecting the extent to which the system’s
security controls are in compliance with relevant procedures,
processes or policies. They argue that cyber security metrics
are often deﬁned imprecisely, and used improperly. In our ap-
proach, we distinguish between how a metric is deﬁned and
how it is computed; while we may have issues with how
MFC can be computed in practice, we have no issue with
how it is deﬁned; it is the statistical mean of a clearly deﬁned
random variable.
In (Center for Internet Security, 2009), a set of MTTF-like
metrics are proposed to capture the concept of cyber security.
These include: mean time to incident discovery; incident rate;
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recovery; vulnerability scan coverage; percentage of systems
without known severe vulnerabilities; mean time to mitigate
vulnerabilities; number of known vulnerability instances; patch
policy compliance; mean time to patch; etc. These metrics fea-
ture the same weaknesses that we have discussed previously
regarding MTTF; in addition, we feel that MFC subsumes
them in that they can be used to enhance the estimate of
MFC, and that once we know MFC, we likely do not care
to know their speciﬁc value.3. Risk estimation metrics
The importance of security concerns on the development and
exploitation of information systems never ceased to grow. In
fact, information systems are today used everywhere by indi-
viduals or organizations and systems are target to information
security attacks; these attacks could be from hackers, viruses
or internal employees, and it is very clear now that this would
lead to lose a large amount of money, time and other re-
sources. Thus, organizations not only may spend millions of
dollars on technical security equipments such as ﬁrewalls,
IDSs, encryption tools and anti-viruses to try to protect them
against known threats, but also are confronted with great dif-
ﬁculties for evaluating security technology investments because
the technology beneﬁts are difﬁcult to estimate and these ben-
eﬁts depend on attack(s) frequency expectation, damage occur-
rence and effectiveness of security technology to mitigate the
damage(s) from an attack(s) (Tsiakis, 2010). In this context,
the information security risk management model comes to re-
duce cost investment without increasing the risk.
A risk is the probability of cause of a problem when a
threat is triggered by vulnerabilities. Threats are much related
to the characteristics of the assets and vulnerabilities are rele-
vant to the security controls (Foroughi, 2008). Information
Security assets are Information Technology resources or other
components that are part of the Information System, linked to
the business assets. An asset is deﬁned as any element of an
information system that possesses a value. It includes tangible
(software, hardware, personnel) and intangible assets (plans,
organization, external factors, and technical factors). The loss
(or damage) of assets in an organization due to the cyber secu-
rity incidents is measured by considering assets, threats, and
vulnerability and so, the risk of an information system’s asset
could be determined by the following formula (Tsiakis, 2010;
Foroughi, 2008):
Risk ¼ Threat  Vulnerability  Impact
In other words, risk is characterized by the opportunity of a
threat targeting Information Security assets, to exploit one
or more vulnerabilities originating from the design decisions,
and leading to an impact on decision goals.
3.1. Risk estimation metrics review
Quantitative risk analysis aspires to cede precise numeric mon-
etary values to assets. It designates the ﬁnancial risk of threats
impact and frequency, costs of control and loss.
As quantitative information risk models, we can cite the
single loss expectancy (SLE), and the annual loss expectancy
(ALE) (Tsiakis, 2010; Boehme and Nowey, 2008).3.1.1. Single loss expectancy (SLE)
The single loss expectancy (SLE) is the expected monetary loss
every time a risk occurs. It is calculated by multiplying asset va-
lue (AV) with Exposure Factor (EF) as shown in formula [2]:
SLE ¼ AV  EF
Where AV is the ﬁnancial value of the asset and EF is ex-
pressed within a range from 0% to 100% that an asset’s value
will be destroyed by risk.
3.1.2. Annual loss expectancy (ALE)
The annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the expected cumulative
cost of risk over a period of one year. It is deﬁned as the cost
(loss in monetary units) of the damage resulted by a failure
multiplied by its frequency in a period of one year:
ALE ¼ SLE ARO
where: the annual rate of occurrence (ARO) is the probability
that a risk will occur in this particular period of one year.
3.1.3. OCTAVE
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnera-
bility Evaluation) is a risk-based strategic assessment and plan-
ning technique for security which was developed by the
Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University
in USA (Mayer, 2009). The method aims are examining orga-
nizational and technological issues as well as deﬁning an orga-
nization’s security strategy and plan. It consists of three steps:
making ﬁle of threat scenarios based on assets, recognizing the
vulnerabilities about major facilities, and assessing the risk and
developing security strategies.
The ﬁrst step allows identifying assets of the system, secu-
rity requirements (conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability),
threat proﬁles and main vulnerabilities by interviewing some
people during workshops. The second step identiﬁes vulnera-
bilities that expose those threats and creates risks to the orga-
nization. In the last step, it develops a practice-based
protection strategy and risk mitigation plans to support the
organization’s missions and priorities.
3.1.4. CRAMM
The CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Meth-
od) method was developed since 1985 by the Central Com-
puter and Telecommunications Agency of the UK
government (Mayer, 2009). The methodological part of
CRAMM is composed of three steps:
 The ﬁrst step identiﬁes assets which are divided into three
classes: physical assets, software and data. The valuation
of assets is generally done in terms of the impact coming
from information potentially being unavailable, destroyed,
disclosed or modiﬁed for software and data. This estimation
of assets may be done in a quantitative way by valuing them
in ﬁnancial terms by data owners (the business unit
managers).
 The second step identiﬁes and estimates the level of threats
and vulnerabilities and provides some mapping between
threats and assets and between threats and impacts in a
qualitative way.
 The third step produces a set of countermeasures that are
considered as necessary to manage the identiﬁed risks.
66 L.B.A. Rabai et al.3.1.5. Information security risk management framework for the
cloud computing environments
The work presents a qualitative information risk management
framework for better understanding critical areas of focus in
cloud computing environment and identifying threats and vul-
nerabilities. The qualitative risk analysis proposed method is
used to approach risk assessment and rank severity of threats
by using classes such as low, medium and high of probabilities
and damages for cloud providers. That is, to help providers to
control their security position and then to proceed to risk mit-
igation (Zhang et al., 2010).
The framework has seven processes including: selecting rel-
evant critical areas, strategy and planning, risk analysis, risk
assessment, risk mitigation, assessing and monitoring pro-
gram, and risk management review. Each process will be nec-
essary to clarify speciﬁc roles, responsibilities, and
accountability for each major process step (Zhang et al., 2010).
In the ﬁrst step, the method highlights the areas of concern
for cloud computing environment. For example, if you are a
SaaS provider, you may select application security, identify ac-
cess management, assessing threats and risks of vulnerabilities
to organization. After proposing a strategy and planning pro-
cess, the risk analysis step allows identifying threat sources (at-
tacker, hackers) in cloud computing and identifying essential
vulnerabilities in order to protect hosts, network devices, and
applications from attacks against known vulnerabilities. The
risk assessment step was divided into four major processes:
likelihood determinations, impact analysis, risk determination
and control recommendations. It represents the probability
that a potential vulnerability could be exercised by a given
threat source in a qualitative way (high, medium, low) and
determines the adverse impact resulting from a successful
threat exercise of vulnerability and ﬁnally it represents, in a
qualitative way, the risk levels and control recommendations
to reduce this risk in a cloud computing system. In the risk mit-
igation step, a cloud provider develops risk treatment plans
(RTP) to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats. Finally, a cloud
provider should monitor the risk treatment plan.
3.1.6. MFC
In BenAissa et al. (2010) present a quantitative infrastructure
that estimates the security of a system. The model measures
the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stake-
holder stands to sustain as a result of security breakdowns.
The infrastructure in question reﬂects the values that stake-
holders have in each security requirement, the dependency of
security requirements on the operation of architectural compo-
nents, and the impact that security threats.
3.2. Comparing risk estimation metrics
CRAMM, OCTAVE and the risk management model for
cloud computing are simple frameworks for assessing security
risks for information systems and they allow selecting appro-
priate security solutions (countermeasures) after identifying
security risks. However, they are qualitative models, i.e., the
assessment of probability and risks is based on a ‘‘low/med-
ium/high’’ characterization rather than a speciﬁc probability
and a speciﬁc dollar amount of loss. Besides, they do not dis-
tinguish between stakeholders: they provide the level of secu-
rity risk for the system provider.The SLE and ALE are quantitative risk estimation metrics.
However, they reﬂect the loss risk of the whole system and they
ignore the variance stakes among different stakeholders.
On the other hand, the MVC, as a quantitative metric,
takes into account:
 The variance in failure cost from one requirement to
another.
 The variance in failure probability from one component to
another.
 The variance in failure impact from one stakeholder to
another.
The MFC presents many advantages:
 It provides a failure cost per unit of time (mean failure
cost): it quantiﬁes the cost in terms of ﬁnancial loss per unit
of operation time (e.g. $/h).
 It quantiﬁes the impact of failures: it provides cost as a
result of security attacks.
 It distinguishes between stakeholders: it provides cost for
each system’s stakeholder as a result of a security failure.
4. Mean failure cost: a measure of cyber-security
In BenAissa et al. (2010) introduce the concept of mean fail-
ure Cost as a measure of dependability in general, and a mea-
sure of cyber security in particular. We note that we have
used it in an E-commerce environment in BenAissa et al.
(2010), and in an E-learning environment in Ben Arfa Rabai
et al. (2012).
4.1. The stakes matrix
We consider a system S and we let H1, H2, H3, . . .,Hk, be stake-
holders of the system, i.e. parties that have a stake in its oper-
ation. We let R1, R2, R3, . . .,Rn, be security requirements that
we wish to impose on the system, and we let STi,j, for 1 6 i 6 k
and 1 6 j 6 n, be the stake that stakeholder Hi has in meeting
security requirement Rj. We let PRj, for 1 6 j 6 n be the prob-
ability that the system fails to meet security requirement Rj,
and we let MFCi (Mean Failure Cost), for 1 6 i 6 k, be the
random variable that represents the cost to stakeholder Hi that
may result from a security failure.
We quantify this random variable in terms of ﬁnancial loss
per unit of operation time (e.g. $/h); it represents the loss of
service that the stakeholder may experience as a result of a
security failure. Under some assumptions of statistical inde-
pendence, we ﬁnd that the Mean Failure Cost for stakeholder
Hi can be written as:
MFCi ¼
X
1jn
STi;j  PRj:
If we let MFC be the column-vector of size k that represents
mean failure costs, let ST be the k · n matrix that represents
stakes, and let PR be the column-vector of size n that repre-
sents probabilities of failing security requirements, then this
can be written using the matrix product ():
MFC ¼ ST  PR:
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stakeholders. As for PR, we discuss below how to generate it.
4.2. The dependency matrix
We consider the architecture of system S, and let C1, C2,
C3, . . .,Ch, be the components of system S. Whether a particu-
lar security requirement is met or not may conceivably depend
on which component of the system architecture is operational.
If we assume that no more than one component of the archi-
tecture may fail at any time, and deﬁne the following events:
 Ei, 1 6 i 6 h, is the event: the operation of component Ci is
affected due to a security breakdown.
 Em+1: No component is affected.
Given a set of complementary events E1, E2, E3, . . . Eh,
Eh+1, we know that the probability of an event F can be writ-
ten in terms of conditional probabilities as:
PðFÞ ¼
Xhþ1
k¼1
PðFjEkÞ  PðEkÞ:
We instantiate this formula with F being the event: the system
fails with respect to some security requirement. To this effect,
we let Fj denote the event that the system fails with respect to
requirement Rj and we write (given that the probability of fail-
ure with respect to Rj is denoted by PRj):Figure 1 MFPRj ¼
Xmþ1
k¼1
PðFjjEkÞ  PðEkÞ:
 If we introduce the DP (Dependency) matrix, which has n
rows and h+ 1 columns, where the entry at row j and col-
umn k is the probability that the system fails with respect to
security requirement j given that component k has failed
(or, for k= h+ 1, that no component has failed), and
 If we introduce vector PE of size h+ 1, such that PEk is the
probability of event Ek, then we can write: PR = DP  PE.
Matrix DP can be derived by the system’s architect, in light
of the role that each component of the architecture plays to
achieve each security goal. As for deriving vector PE, we dis-
cuss this matter in the next section.4.3. The impact matrix
Components of the architecture may fail to operate properly as
a result of security breakdowns brought about by malicious
activity. In order to continue the analysis, we must specify
the catalog of threats that we are dealing with, in the same
way that analysts of a system’s reliability deﬁne a fault model.
To this effect, we catalog the set of security threats that we are
facing, and we let T1, T2, T3, . . .Tp, represent the event that a
cataloged threat has materialized, and we let Tp+1, be theC matrices.
68 L.B.A. Rabai et al.event that no threat has materialized. Also, we let PT be the
vector of size p+ 1 such that
 PTq, for 1 6 q 6 p, is the probability that threat Tq has
materialized during a unitary period of operation (say, 1 h).
 PTp+1 is the probability that no threat has materialized
during a unitary period of operation time.
Then, by virtue of the probabilistic identity cited above, we
can write:
PEk ¼
Xpþ1
q¼1
PðEkjTqÞ  PTq:
If we introduce the following components
 IM (Impact) matrix, which has h+ 1 rows and p+ 1 col-
umns, and where the entry at row k and column q is the
probability that component Ck fails given that threat q
has materialized (or, for q= p+ 1, that no threat has
materialized)
 PT vector of size p+ 1, such that PTq is the probability of
event Tq.
Then we can writePE ¼ IM  PT
Matrix IM can be derived by analyzing which threats affect
which components, and assessing the likelihood of success of
each threat, in light of perpetrator behavior and possible
countermeasures. Vector PT can be derived from known
perpetrator behavior, perpetrator models, known system vul-
nerabilities, etc. We refer to this vector as the Threat Conﬁg-
uration Vector or simply as the Threat Vector.
4.4. Summary
Given the stakes matrix ST, the dependability matrix DP, the
impact matrix IM and the threat vector PT, we can derive the
vector of mean failure costs (one entry per stakeholder) by the
following formula:
MFC ¼ ST DP  IM  PT;
where matrix ST is derived collectively by the stakeholders,
matrix DP is derived by the systems architect, matrix IM is de-
rived by the security analyst from architectural information,
and vector PT is derived by the security analyst from perpetra-
tor models. Fig. 1 below illustrates these matrices and their
attributes (size, content, indexing, etc.).
5. Stakeholder focus: security requirements
We consider three classes of stakeholders in a cloud computing
situation, namely: the service provider, the corporate or orga-
nizational subscribers, and the individual subscribers.
The cloud computing system conﬁdentiality, integrity and
availability are important pillars of cloud security software
assurance (Hanna, 2009; Subashini and Kavitha, 2010; Woo-
ley, 2011; Krutz, 2010). Therefore, as for security require-
ments, we consider the three principles of information
security, namely: availability, integrity, and conﬁdentiality.
We further reﬁne this classiﬁcation by considering differentlevels of criticality of the data to which these requirements
apply:
 Availability: Availability refers to the subscriber’s ability
to retrieve his/ her information when he/she needs it.
Un-availability may be more or less costly depending
on how critical the data is to the timely operation of
the subscriber.
o Critical data: This data is critical to the day-to-day (or
minute-by-minute) operation of the subscriber, and
any delay in making this data available is deemed dis-
ruptive to the subscriber. For example, product data
for an e-commerce merchant; the merchant cannot con-
duct business without it, and stands to lose sales as well
as customer loyalty as a result of un-availability.
o Archival data: Archival data typically has two attributes
that set it apart from critical data: ﬁrst, it is accessed sel-
dom; second, its access is not time-critical, i.e. delays in
delivering it do not cause a great loss. In an e-Com-
merce application, this data could be, for example,
archival order data: such data is accessed only in excep-
tional cases (for example: a customer has a complaint,
or wants to return or exchange merchandise), not a rou-
tine operation; and when that data is needed, it is
accessed off-line (for example, by staff who are handling
a customer complaint), rather than as part of an inter-
active operation. As a result of these two attributes,
unavailability of archival data carries a much lower pen-
alty than unavailability of critical data.
 Integrity: Integrity refers to the assurances offered to sub-
scribers that their data is not lost or damaged as a result
of malicious or inadvertent activity. Violations of integ-
rity may be more or less costly depending on how critical
the data is to the secured operation of the subscriber.
o Critical data: This data is critical to the normal opera-
tion of subscriber functions; if this data is lost, subscrib-
ers can no longer operate normally, or can no longer
operate at all. For example, if we are talking about a
subscriber who is an e-Commerce merchant, critical
data would be his product catalog that includes product
identiﬁcation, product pricing, and product availability
for his merchandise.
o Archival data: This data is not critical to the operation
of the subscriber, in the sense that the subscriber can
operate if this data is lost or damaged. We assume that
if integrity is lost, subscribers are duly informed. For
example, if we are talking about a subscriber who is
an e-Commerce merchant, archival data would be the
ﬁle that contains customer information or (for even less
critical data) or information about customer
recommendations.
 Conﬁdentiality: Conﬁdentiality refers to the assurances
offered by subscribers that their data is protected from
unauthorized access. Violations of conﬁdentiality may
be more or less costly depending on how conﬁdential
the divulged data is.
o Highly classiﬁed data: Exposure of this data to unautho-
rized parties represents an unrecoverable loss for the
subscriber that carries a very high cost, including
unquantiﬁable/imponderable costs (such as loss of life,
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Commerce subscriber, this may represent detailed per-
sonal data of its client database; exposure of such infor-
mation can lead to identity theft on a massive scale,
which leads in turn to customer dissatisfaction, dam-
aged corporate reputation, civil liability, penal lawsuits,
etc.
o Proprietary data: Exposure of this data to unauthorized
parties represents an important but controllable and
quantiﬁable loss; the scale of this loss is limited by its
nature (typically: ﬁnancial loss) and its scale (quantiﬁ-
able and recoverable). For a corporate subscriber, this
may be proprietary information about its intellectual
property, its products or its processes.
o Public data: Exposure of this data to unauthorized par-
ties represents a minor and recoverable loss, resulting in
perhaps a slight loss of competitive advantage. For a
corporate subscriber, this could be demographic infor-
mation about its customer base; a competitor who gains
access to that data may cancel whatever marketing
advantage the data afforded the subscriber.
For the purposes of our model, we assume that we are deal-
ing with seven generic security requirements, namely:
 AVC: Availability of critical data.
 AVA: Availability of archival data.
 INC: Integrity of critical data.
 INA: Integrity of archival data.
 CC: Conﬁdentiality of classiﬁed data.
 CP: Conﬁdentiality of proprietary data.
 CB: Conﬁdentiality of public data.
We assume that the provider makes different provisions for
these requirements, putting more emphasis on critical require-
ments than on less critical requirements. We further assume,
for the sake of argument, that for each requirement, the pro-
vider makes the same provisions for all its subscribers; hence,
if the provider fails to meet a particular requirement, that fail-
ure applies to all the subscribers that are dependent on it.
For the sake of illustration, we consider a ﬁctitious running
example, where we have a cloud computing provider (PR), and
a sample of three subscribers:
 A corporate subscriber (CS).
 A governmental subscriber (GS).
 An individual subscriber (IS).
The purpose of this example is to illustrate the variance in
stakes that the various stakeholders have in the operation of
the cloud rather than, strictly speaking, to reﬂect a realistic sit-
uation. On the basis of these deﬁnitions, we propose the fol-
lowing Stakes matrix as shown in Table 1. Each entry of the
matrix represents, for stakeholder H and requirement R, the
loss incurred by H if requirement R was violated (we use $K
to designate thousands of dollars). In the columns for the
availability requirements (AVC, AVA), we assume, for the
sake of argument, a repair time of one hour; hence each failure
with respect to the availability requirement causes a downtime
of one hour; costs will be estimated accordingly. There are a
number of dependencies that, for the sake of simplicity, wedo not show in this matrix. For example, the stakes of the pro-
vider in meeting each security requirement depend on the
stakes that each category of subscribers has in meeting that
requirement, as well as the number of subscribers in each cat-
egory; also, the stakes that each subscriber has in meeting each
security requirement depends on the volume of data that they
ﬁle under each category of data (critical, archival, proprietary,
classiﬁed, etc.). We envision extensions of our current model
that take these dependencies into account.6. System focus: components and services
When we talk about a cloud computing system, we focus on
two parts: the front end and the back end, connected to each
other through the Internet. The front end is the side of the
computer user or client including the client’s computer and
the application required to access the cloud computing system.
The back end is the ‘‘cloud’’ section of the system, which in-
cludes the various physical/virtual computers, servers, soft-
ware and data storage systems. Cloud computing providers
can offer services at different layers of the resource stack, sim-
ulating the functions performed by applications, operating sys-
tems, or physical hardware. The most common approach (Mell
and Grance, 2009; Vaquero et al., 2009; Fester et al., 2008) de-
ﬁnes cloud computing services as three layers of services:
 Software as a Service (SaaS) offers ﬁnished applications
that end users can access through a thin client. Examples
of SaaS include Gmail, Google Docs, and Salesforce.com.
The end user does not exercise any control over the design
of the application, servers, networking, and storage
infrastructure.
 Platform as a Service (PaaS) offers an operating system as
well as suites of programing languages and software devel-
opment tools that customers can use to develop their own
applications. Prominent examples include Microsoft Win-
dows Azure and Google App Engine. PaaS gives end users
control over application design, but does not give them con-
trol over the physical infrastructure.
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offers end users direct
access to processing, storage, and other computing
resources, allowing them to conﬁgure those resources and
run operating systems and software on them as they see
ﬁt. Examples of IaaS include Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) and IBM Blue cloud.
The cloud computing paradigm optimizes in costs of physi-
cal resources (servers, CPUs, memories . . .) by the virtualiza-
tion techniques. In (Vaughan-Nichols, 2008) Vaughan-
Nichols et al. deﬁne these techniques as a technology that lets
a single PC or server simultaneously run multiple operating sys-
tems or multiple sessions of a single OS. This lets users put
numerous applications and functions on a PC or server, instead
of having to run them on separate machines as in the past.
Fig. 2 summarizes cloud computing architecture, services and
user tools (Varia, 2008; Orea et al., 2011). Applications/services
and basic functions provided in a Cloud are based on the Vir-
tual resources which are abstracted from Physical Resources.
 Virtual physical resources, such as V-CPUs, V-Storages, V-
Networks etc.
Table 1 Cloud computing: a sample stakes matrix.
Requirements
AVC AVA INC INA CC CP CB
Stakeholders
PR 500 $K 90 $K 800 $K 150 $K 1500 $K 1200 $K 120 $K
CS 150 $K 40 $K 220 $K 80 $K 250 $K 180 $K 60 $K
GS 60 $K 20 $K 120 $K 50 $K 2500 $K 30 $K 12 $K
IS 0.050 $K 0.015 $K 0.300 $K 0.200 $K 0.300 $K 0.100 $K 0.010 $K
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Switches.
 V-Firewalls, VPNs, V-Interfaces, V-Links based on physi-
cal Router/Switch equipments.
Computational resources are managed in terms of Virtual
Machines (VMs) and/or Virtual Clusters (VCs). Despite of
the virtualization of resources, the cloud computing threats
do not distinguish between real and virtual components. To
simplify the mechanisms of operation in a cloud architecture
(Varia, 2008; Orea et al., 2011), we will use the names of com-
ponents independent of their types (virtual/physical). A sample
cloud computing system content includes:
 A browser.
 A proxy server.
 A router/Firewall.
 A load balancer.
 A web server.
 An application server.
 A database server.
 A backup server, and
 A storage server
Assuming no more than one component fails at a time, and
considering the additional event that no component has failed,Figure 2 Cloud computingthe dependability matrix has (9 + 1=) 10 columns and 7 rows
(one for each security requirement), for a total of 70 entries.
In (Ben Aissa, 2012), we have collected empirical data on a
large sample of systems, to enable us to analyze how various
security requirements are dependent on the integrity of system
components; this information is essential to ﬁlling the depen-
dency matrix. To this effect, we have deﬁned broad categories
of system components, classiﬁed security requirements into
standard categories, then collected empirical data on how of-
ten a failure of a component of a given category leads to sys-
tem failure with respect to a given security requirement. In the
absence of other sources of information, we use this data to ﬁll
out dependency matrix, as shown in Table 2.
7. Provider focus: security threats
Virtualization, the software layer that emulates hardware to
increase utilization in large datacenters, is one of the main
components of a cloud computing system (Ibrahim et al.,
2010), but it causes major security risks. In fact, ensuring that
different instances running on the same physical machine are
isolated from each other is a major task of virtualization.
Therefore, a cloud computing system is threatened by many
types of attacks, including security threats between the sub-
scriber and the datacenter, the hypervisor and the VMs and
among the VMs themselves (Wooley, 2011).services and architecture.
Table 3 Threat vector.
Threats Probability
Monitoring virtual machines from host
(MVM)
8.063 · 104
Communications between virtual machines
and host (CBVH)
8.063 · 104
Virtual machine modiﬁcation (VMm) 8.063 · 104
Placement of malicious VM images on
physical systems (VMS)
8.063 · 104
Monitoring VMs from other VM (VMM) 40.31 · 104
Communication between VMs (VMC) 40.31 · 104
Virtual machine mobility (VMM) 40.31 · 104
Denial of service (DoS) 14.39 · 104
Flooding attacks (FA) 56.44 · 104
Data loss or leakage (DL) 5.75 · 104
Malicious insiders (MI) 6.623 · 104
Account, service and traﬃc hijacking (ASTH) 17.277 · 104
Abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing
(ANU)
17.277 · 104
Insecure application programing interfaces
(IAI)
29.026 · 104
No threats (NoT) 0.9682
Table 2 Dependency matrix.
Components
Browser Proxy
server
Router/
ﬁrewall
Load
balancer
Web
server
Application
server
Database
server
Backup
server
Storage
server
No
failure
Security requirements
AVC 1 1 1 1 0.44 0.28 1 0.01 1 0
AVA 1 1 1 1 0.44 0.28 0.28 0.01 1 0
INC 0.14 0.14 1 1 0.44 0.14 1 0.01 1 0
INA 0.14 0.14 1 1 0.44 0.14 0.14 0.01 1 0
CC 0.44 0.14 1 1 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.01 0.44 0
CP 0.44 0.14 1 1 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.01 0.44 0
CB 0.44 0.14 1 1 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.01 0.44 0
A cybersecurity model in cloud computing environments 71We consider the security threats that are most often cited in
relation with cloud computing systems (Security Alliance,Table 4 Impact matrix.
Threats
MVH CVH VMm VMS MVV VMC VMM
Components
Brws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prox 0.01 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
R/FW 0.03 0.05 0.033 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
LB 0.02 0.003 0 0.01 0.02 0.003 0.003
WS 0.03 0.003 0.033 0 0.03 0.003 0.003
AS 0.02 0.003 0.033 0.06 0.02 0.003 0.003
DBS 0.001 0 0.033 0.04 0.001 0 0
BS 0.001 0 0 0.04 0.001 0 0
SS 0.04 0.05 0 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
NoF 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.042010; Ibrahim et al., 2010; Subashini and Kavitha, 2010;
Wayne and Timothy, 2011; Wooley, 2011).
7.1. Security threats originating from the host (hypervisor)
7.1.1. Monitoring virtual machines from host
Monitoring the VM from the hypervisor software is an impor-
tant part of managing and controlling the VMs. Hypervisor is
the software that controls the layer between the hardware and
the operating systems. The system administrator or other
authorized user can make changes to the components of one
or more virtual machines (VMs), generating a security risk
(Wooley, 2011).
7.1.2. Virtual machine modiﬁcation
Hypervisor represents the next lower layer of software under
the customer’s operating system, applications and data. At-
tacks on the hypervisor layer are attractive to hackers because
of the scope of control they can gain if they can install and exe-
cute their malicious software on this layer of the VM software
(Ibrahim et al., 2010). Compromising the hypervisor means
that an attacker can take control of that layer and all of the
hosted virtual machines that are hosted on that machine
(Ibrahim et al., 2010).DoS FA DL MI ASTH ANU IAI NoT
0.02 0.01 0 0.03 0.02 0 0.03 0
0.02 0.01 0 0.005 0.02 0.01 0 0
0.06 0.04 0 0.005 0.02 0.01 0.01 0
0.06 0.04 0 0.005 0.02 0.01 0.01 0
0.02 0.04 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0
0.036 0.04 0 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07 0
0.036 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0
0.036 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0
0.036 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.005 1
Table 5 Mean failure cost vector.
Stakeholders MFC ($K/h)
PR 15.20443
CS 3.53839
GS 8.98502
IS 0.00341
Table 6 The newthreat vector.
Threats Probability
Monitoring virtual machines from host
(MVM)
7.9477 · 104
Communications between virtual machines
and host (CBVH)
7.9477 · 104
Virtual machine modiﬁcation (VMm) 7.9477 · 104
Placement of malicious VM images on
physical systems (VMS)
7.9477 · 104
Monitoring VMs from other VM (VMM) 39.7335 · 104
Communication between VMs (VMC) 39.7335 · 104
Virtual machine mobility (VMM) 39.7335 · 104
Denial of service (DoS) 14.1842 · 104
Flooding attacks (FA) 55.6329 · 104
Data loss or leakage (DL) 5.6695 · 104
Malicious insiders (MI) 6.5302 · 104
Account, service and traﬃc hijacking (ASTH) 17.035 · 104
Abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing
(ANU)
17.035 · 104
Insecure application programing interfaces (IAI) 28.619 · 104
No threats (NoT) 0.9704
Table 7 Hourly gains in mean failure cost.
Stakeholders D MFC ($/h)
PR 216.531
CS 50.392
GS 127.964
IS 0.048
Table 8 Monthly gains in mean failure cost.
Stakeholders D MFC ($K/month of service)
PR 21.6531
CS 5.0392
GS 12.7964
IS 4.8 · 103
72 L.B.A. Rabai et al.7.1.3. Threats on communications between virtual machines and
host
In a cloud computing system, all communications must pass
through the hypervisor to all of the hosted VMs, and at this
point, an attacker can inject malicious software in an attempt
to eavesdrop or gain control over any or all of the systems.
However, the worst case occurs when the hypervisor is com-
promised by malware, since this puts all the VMs that are
being hosted on that machine at risk for security breaches
(Wooley, 2011).
7.1.4. Placement of malicious VM images on physical systems
The attack known as cloud malware injection involves creating
a malicious virtual machine image and then places that image
into the hypervisor so that it is treated like a legitimate system
in a collection of virtual machines. If this is successful, then the
malicious virtual machine image is allowed to run the adver-
sary’s code (Ibrahim et al., 2010; Wooley, 2011).
7.2. Security threats originating between the customer and the
datacenter
7.2.1. Flooding attacks
Cloud Computing enables companies to rent server hardware
on demand. Thus, instead of buying sufﬁcient server hardware
for the high workload times, Cloud Computing enables a dy-
namic adaptation of these resources. The dynamic provision-
ing of a cloud in some ways simpliﬁes the work of an
attacker to cause threat. The corresponding threat is of ﬂood-ing attacks which consist of overloading the server hosting ser-
vices with an enormous number of requests for data processing
(Wooley, 2011).
7.2.2. Denial of service (DoS)
The denial of service attack is a critical problem for virtual ma-
chines (VMs) used on cloud components. In fact, it indicates
that the hypervisor software is allowing a single VM to con-
sume all the system resources and thus starving the remaining
VMs and impairing their function (Wooley, 2011).
7.2.3. Data loss or leakage
The threat of data compromise increases because of the archi-
tectural or operational characteristics of the cloud environ-
ment (user’s data is stored outside the enterprise boundary,
by the service provider). Data loss may be caused by opera-
tional failures due to insufﬁcient authentication or authoriza-
tion. Data loss may also be caused by deletion or alteration
of records without a backup of the original content. Thus,
intrusion of data can be done either by hacking through the
loop holes in the application or by injecting client code into
the system (Subashini and Kavitha, 2010; Wayne and Timo-
thy, 2011).
7.2.4. Malicious insiders
This threat is ampliﬁed for consumers of cloud services by the
convergence of information technology (IT) services combined
with a general lack of transparency into provider process and
procedure (Security Alliance, 2010). Such threats include
fraud, sabotage and theft or loss of conﬁdential information
caused by trusted insiders. The impact that malicious insiders
can have on an organization is considerable, given their level
of access and ability to inﬁltrate organizations and assets like
brand damage, ﬁnancial impact and productivity losses.
7.2.5. Account, service and trafﬁc hijacking
Attack methods such as phishing, fraud and exploitation of
software vulnerabilities still achieve results. Cloud solutions
add a new threat. If an attacker gains access to your creden-
tials, they can eavesdrop on your activities and transaction, re-
turn falsiﬁed information and redirect your clients to
illegitimate sites allowing them to compromise the conﬁdenti-
A cybersecurity model in cloud computing environments 73ality, integrity and availability of those services (Security Alli-
ance, 2010).
7.2.6. Abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing
Cloud computing providers offer their customers an unlimited
computing, network and storage capacity coupled with a weak
registration process where anyone with a valid credit card can
register and immediately begin using cloud services. Cloud
computing providers are targets of attack due to the weakness
of their registration systems, which allows spammers, mali-
cious code authors and other criminals to perform their activ-
ities easily (Security Alliance, 2010).
7.2.7. Insecure application programing interfaces
Cloud computing providers expose a set of software interfaces
or APIs that customers use to manage and interact with cloud
services. These interfaces must be designed to protect against
both accidental and malicious attempts to circumvent policy.
Reliance on a weak set of interfaces and APIs exposes organi-
zations to a variety of security issues related to conﬁdentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability (Security Alliance,
2010).
7.3. Security threats originating from the virtual machines
7.3.1. Monitoring VMs from other VMs
One of the security risks encountered when using virtual ma-
chines is the lack of guaranteed isolation of the application
and data when a shared resource such as memory space is uti-
lized by multiple VMs. Cloud computing servers can contain
tens of VMs and these are vulnerable to attack whether they
are active or not. Active VMs are vulnerable to all of the secu-
rity attacks that a conventional physical service is subject to.
However, once a VM has been compromised by an attack
on other VMs residing on the same physical server, they be-
come all vulnerable to the same attack due to the fact that each
machine shares memory, disk storage, driver software and
hypervisor software (Ibrahim et al., 2010).
7.3.2. Virtual machine mobility
Virtual machines (VMs) which are disk images hosted in a
hypervisor platform are easily copied or transferred to other
locations. The ability to move and copy VMs poses a security
risk because the entire system, applications and data can be
stolen without physically stealing the machine (Wooley, 2011).
7.3.3. Threats on communications between virtual machines
VMs are allowed to communicate with other VMs running on
the same physical equipment using channels such as the shared
clipboard functions. Sharing resources such as memory, real or
virtual network connections, between VMs can introduce pos-
sible security risks for each machine because there is the possi-
bility that one or more of the VMs has been compromised by
malicious programs (Ibrahim et al., 2010; Wooley, 2011).
In this section, we have cataloged fourteen distinct types of
threats. To compute the MFC, we need to know the probabil-
ity of the attack for each threat during one hour. Also, we need
to ﬁll the values of impact matrix IM. The IM matrix relates
component failure to security threats; speciﬁcally, it representsthe probability of failure of components given that some secu-
rity threat has materialized. Tables 3 and 4 represent the im-
pact matrix and the threat vector. For the values in Table 4
(150 entries), it comes from our empirical study (Ben Aissa,
2012) which has an immense source of references.
8. Illustration: a sample service provider
In the previous section, we have cataloged 14 security threats
(Table 3); the impact matrix (Table 4) has 15 columns, one
for each threat plus one for the absence of threats. Using the
3 Matrices (Stakes, Dependency and Impact) and the threat
vector, we can compute the vector of mean failure costs as
shown in Table 5 using the formula:
MFC ¼ ST DP  IM  PT9. Supporting a cloud computing business model
The security cost model enables us to rationalize security re-
lated decision making. We illustrate this premise by two con-
crete examples.
 Pricing a security upgrade. If the provider of cloud comput-
ing services has enhanced the security that it provides to its
customers, and wants to know how much to charge custom-
ers for the security gains, then one way to do this is to com-
pute the gain that each customer achieves as a result of
enhanced security. This can be done by estimating the
impact of the security enhancement on the various compo-
nents of the MFC formula, computing the new MFC vec-
tor, and inferring the difference between MFC before and
after the enhancement. For the sake of illustration, we con-
sider that as a result of a security measure (e.g. an enhanced
ﬁrewall), the threat vector has been reduced to the new
value: PT’ presented in Table 6.
The gain in mean failure cost can then be estimated as:
ðDMFCÞ ¼ ST DP  IM  ðDPTÞ
where PT = PT0  PT. We ﬁnd the hourly gain in MFC as
shown in Table 7:
Assuming that on average subscribers use the cloud com-
puting service 100 h per month, we ﬁnd the monthly gain in
MFC.
Table 8 shows the added value gained by subscribers as a
result of enhanced security; whether the cloud computing pro-
vider wants to charge this amount to subscribers, or make it an
option that subscribers can purchase, is a commercial decision;
our cost model helps decision makers by putting a monetary
value on the service that is delivered to subscribers.
 Judging the cost effectiveness of a security enhancement. For
a given security enhancement measure, the cloud service
provider can determine the cost effectiveness by comparing
the cost of installing the enhancement vs. the gains in sub-
scriber fees collected as a result of enhanced security (minus
any subscriber loss that may result). This can be modeled as
a Return on Investment (ROI) decision, and quantiﬁed by a
ROI function, as discussed in BenAissa et al. (2010).
74 L.B.A. Rabai et al.10. Conclusion: and Future work
Cloud computing is an emerging computing paradigm that of-
fers end users the beneﬁt of virtually unlimited computing re-
sources, the convenience of professional system operation and
maintenance, and the economy of on-demand billing. One
advantage cloud computing does not offer is absolute security
of subscriber data with respect to data integrity, conﬁdential-
ity, and availability; security threats that arise in cloud com-
puting include malicious activity, made possible by the
provision of shared computing resources, as well as inadver-
tent loss of conﬁdentiality or integrity resulting from negli-
gence or mismanagement.
In this paper, we offer a quantitative model of security mea-
surement that enables cloud service providers and cloud sub-
scribers to quantify the risks they take with the security of
their assets, and to make security related decisions on the basis
of quantitative analysis, rather than psychological factors
(fear, phobias, perceptions, etc.). Our proposed metric offers
the following attributes:
 Security is measured in economic terms, enabling stake-
holders to quantify the risks they incur as a result of loss
of security, and to make decisions accordingly.
 Security is not an intrinsic attribute of the system, but also
depends on stakeholders, and may take different values for
different stakeholders, depending on the stakes they have in
the secure operation of the system.
 The value of the MFC security metric reﬂects the heteroge-
neity of security requirements (some requirements carry
more stakes than others), the heterogeneity of system archi-
tectures (some components are more security-critical than
others), the heterogeneity of security threats (some threats
are more menacing than others), and the heterogeneity of
perpetrator behavior (some threats materialize more often
than others).
We envision extending our current work in several direc-
tions, most notably:
 Reﬁne the generic architecture of cloud computing systems,
and use cloud-speciﬁc empirical data to reﬁne the estima-
tion of the dependency matrix and the impact matrix.
 Collect and maintain cyber security data pertaining to secu-
rity threats, and use it to reﬁne the estimation of the threat
vector as it applies to cloud computing infrastructures.
 Use the concept of mean failure cost to support a quantita-
tive economic model of could computing.
These issues are currently under consideration.
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